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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
  Robert Ellis Morton appeals from his sentences on two convictions for 
sexual abuse of a child. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 A jury found Morton guilty of two counts of sexual abuse of a child and of 
having committed a prior offense requiring registration as a sex offender.  (R., pp. 
107-09.)  The district court applied the sentencing enhancement from the prior 
conviction to both counts under I.C. § 19-2520G and imposed consecutive 
sentences of 25 years with 15 years determinate and 15 years determinate.  (R., 
pp. 117-20.)  The district court also imposed fines of $5,000 on each conviction 









  Morton states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in concluding it lacked discretion to 
order that the sentences for the two counts be served 
concurrently? 
 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion in assessing two 
$5,000 fines against Mr. Morton for his two counts of sexual 
abuse of the same child victim? 
 
(Appellant‟s brief, p. 4.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Morton failed to show that the plain language “consecutive to any 
other sentence” in I.C. § 19-2520G is limited to sentences not enhanced 
pursuant to that statute? 
 
2. Has Morton failed to show that the fine allowed in I.C. § 19-5307 “against 
any defendant found guilty of any felony” but “shall be entered” as a civil 
judgment “on behalf of the victim” is limited by the number of victims rather than 










Morton‟s Argument That The Plain Language “Consecutive To Any Other 
Sentence” Contains Limitations On The Sentences That Must Be Run 




 The Idaho legislature has required a mandatory minimum sentence for 
certain sex crimes committed by repeat offenders.  I.C. § 19-2520G(2).  The 
statute also states:  “Any sentence imposed under the provisions of this section 
shall run consecutive to any other sentence imposed by the court.”  I.C. § 19-
2520G(3).  The district court applied this provision to both of Morton‟s enhanced 
sentences and ran them consecutive to each other.  (Tr., p. 400, L. 18 – p. 401, 
L. 7.)  Morton argues the statutory language requiring consecutive sentences 
applies only to “any sentence not imposed under the provisions of this statute.”  
(Appellant‟s brief, p. 7 (emphasis original).)  Morton‟s argument fails under the 
plain language of the statute. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review.  State v. Thompson, 140 
Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404, 405, 





C. Consecutive Sentences Were Mandatory Under The Plain Meaning Of 
The Statute 
 
 The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative 
intent.  State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010); Robison v. 
Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003).  Because the 
best guide to legislative intent is the wording of the statute itself, the 
interpretation of a statute must begin with its literal words.  Verska v. Saint 
Alphonsus Reg‟l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011); State 
v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009).  The words of a statute 
“„must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be 
construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not 
construe it, but simply follows the law as written.‟”  Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, 265 
P.3d at 506 (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 
(2003)).  “[W]here statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and 
other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the 
clearly expressed intent of the legislature.”  Id. (quoting City of Sun Valley v. Sun 
Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963 (1993)). 
 The applicable language is plain.  “Any sentence imposed under the 
provisions of this section shall run consecutive to any other sentence imposed by 
the court.”  I.C. § 19-2520G(3) (emphasis added).  The requirement that “[a]ny” 
enhanced sentence run consecutive to “any other sentence” is all inclusive.   
Morton‟s argument that there is an exception in this language, (Appellant‟s 
brief, p. 7 (“„any other sentence imposed by the court‟” means “any sentence not 
imposed under the provisions of this statute” (emphasis original)), is without 
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merit.  The word “other” as used in the statute does not mean “not imposed 
under the provisions of this statute” as he asserts.  Morton has therefore failed to 
show the district court erred by ordering consecutive sentences. 
 
II. 
Morton‟s Argument That The Fine Provided By I.C. § 19-5307 Applies Based On 





 The district court ordered a $5,000 fine for each conviction pursuant to I.C. 
§ 19-5307.  (Tr., p. 401, Ls. 8-14; R., p. 119.)  Morton asserts on appeal that the 
$5,000 fine applies per victim, and because the case involved a single victim the 
district court erred.  (Appellant‟s brief, pp. 9-12.)  The plain language of the 
statute, however, applies the fine per conviction.  Therefore Morton has shown 
no error by imposing one fine for each conviction.  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review.  State v. Thompson, 140 
Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404, 405, 
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 
C. The District Court Properly Ordered Two Fines Because Morton Was 
Convicted Of Two Qualifying Felonies 
 
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative 
intent.  State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010); Robison v. 
Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003).  Because the 
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best guide to legislative intent is the wording of the statute itself, the 
interpretation of a statute must begin with its literal words.  Verska v. Saint 
Alphonsus Reg‟l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011); State 
v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009).  The words of a statute 
“„must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be 
construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not 
construe it, but simply follows the law as written.‟”  Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, 265 
P.3d at 506 (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 
(2003)).  “[W]here statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and 
other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the 
clearly expressed intent of the legislature.”  Id. (quoting City of Sun Valley v. Sun 
Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963 (1993)). 
The statute provides that the court “may impose a fine not to exceed five 
thousand dollars ($5,000) against any defendant found guilty of any felony listed 
in subsection (2) of this section.”  I.C. § 19-5307(1).  Morton was found guilty of 
two qualifying felonies.  (R., pp. 107-09.)  Because the fine attaches to the finding 
of guilt of “any” qualifying felony, and Morton was found guilty of two qualifying 
felonies, the district court followed the explicit statutory instruction. 
Morton argues: “Under the plain language of section 19-5307, a court may 
impose a fine in a case involving a crime of violence „on behalf of the victim 
named in the indictment or information, or the family of the victim in cases of 
homicides or crimes against children.‟”  (Appellant‟s brief, p. 10.)  While the part 
of the statute quoted here by Morton is accurate, the part paraphrased is not.  
7 
 
The actual language of the statute is as follows:  “The fine shall operate as a civil 
judgment against the defendant, and shall be entered on behalf of the victim 
named in the indictment or information, or the family of the victim in cases of 
homicide or crimes against children ….”  I.C. § 19-5307(1).  Thus, the fine of up 
to $5,000 is “impose[d] … against any defendant found guilty of any” qualifying 
felony, and “operate[s] as a civil judgment against the defendant, and shall be 
entered on behalf of the victim.”  Id.  The plain language provides for a fine for 
each conviction, which fine is entered as a civil judgment on behalf of the victim.  
Nothing in this language prohibits multiple fines or multiple judgments for multiple 
convictions.   
The plain language of the statute provides that a fine may be imposed 
upon each qualifying conviction.  That the statute also treats any fine so imposed 
as a civil judgment entered on behalf of the victim does not limit the number of 
fines that may be imposed.  Morton has failed to show error in imposing two fines 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the 
district court. 
 




      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen__________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
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